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Abstract 
 
 
 
Nowadays, most electricity users bid into the market putting an infinite value on energy in 
which concerns to the price to pay for it, without taking profit of the possibility to change 
their consumption to hours in which the cost of energy is lower. Demand response programs 
allow users to interact with the market and make changes in their consumption profiles as to 
diminish the cost of purchasing energy. Previous developed demand response models based on 
a bidding process, such as the centralized one, entail problems such as scalability or privacy, 
and decentralized models relying on unidirectional communication entail problems such as 
avalanche effects. To overcome those problems, a new decentralized model relying on 
bidirectional communication was developed in this work. In this model, each user bids into 
the market according to their consumption urgency and a set of parameters defined by a 
reinforcement learning algorithm. The bids are aggregated at the intermediate level by an 
aggregator agent, who then communicates the aggregate bids into the market. After the 
market clearing price is determined, it is communicated to the aggregator and then to the 
end-users, who buy energy according to the market price and their previously defined 
demand bids. The goal is to minimize the costs of buying energy. Three demand response 
level were considered as to analyze the impact of the demand response level in the cost of 
purchasing energy. The obtained results are compared to the results obtained with a 
centralized model and an uncontrolled approach. Results demonstrate that the decentralized 
model of this work reduces considerably the costs of purchasing energy when comparing to an 
uncontrolled approach, and almost as optimally as a centralized model. 
 
Key-words: Multi-Agent System; Bidding Strategy; Decentralized Market-Based Scheme; 
Demand Response. 
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Resumo 
 
 
 
Nos dias correntes, a grande maioria dos consumidores de energia definem a sua procura de 
energia atribuindo um valor infinito à energia no que diz respeito ao valor a pagar por esta, 
não tirando partido da possibilidade de alterar o consumo de energia para outras horas de 
menor custo energético. Programas de demand response permitem aos utilizadores de energia 
a sua interação com o mercado de energia, fazendo estes alterações nos seus perfis de 
consumo de forma a diminuir o custo de compra de energia. Modelos de demand response 
baseados em licitações, tal como o modelo centralizado, estão associados a problemas tais 
como a escalabilidade e a privacidade da informação dos consumidores, sendo que modelos 
descentralizados baseado em comunicação unidirecional estão associados a problemas tais 
como os efeitos avalanche. De forma a ultrapassar os mencionados problemas, foi 
desenvolvido neste trabalho um modelo descentralizado baseado em comunicação 
bidirecional. Neste modelo, cada consumidor faz uma licitação ao mercado energético de 
acordo com a sua urgência de consumo energético e um conjunto de parâmetros definidos 
através de um algoritmo de reinforcement learning. As licitações são agregadas no nível 
intermédio por um agente agregador, o qual posteriormente comunica as licitações ao 
mercado. Após determinação do preço por unidade de energia, este é comunicado ao agente 
agregador, e posteriormente aos consumidores, os quais compram energia de acordo com este 
mesmo preço e as suas curvas de procura previamente definidas. O objetivo deste trabalho 
consiste em minimizar o custo de compra de energia. Três níveis de demand response foram 
considerados de forma a analisar o impacto do nível de penetração de demand response no 
custo de compra de energia. Os resultados são comparados com os resultados obtidos através 
de um modelo centralizado, bem como com os resultados obtidos num cenário de carga 
totalmente inflexível. Os resultados demonstram que o modelo descentralizado desenvolvido 
neste trabalho reduz consideravelmente o custo de compra de energia quando comparado 
com um cenário de carga totalmente inflexível, e de forma quase tão otimizada como um 
modelo centralizado. 
 
Palavras-chave: Sistema Multi-Agente; Estratégia de Licitação; Esquema Base-Mercado 
Descentralizado; Demand Response. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
One of the major problems in the present era consists on carefully and wisely explore the 
resources that can be obtained throughout interaction and exploration of the present 
resources on our planet. As for that, it is important not only to explore resources efficiently, 
but also to explore them in a way that considers consistency on its exploration. 
A problem that energy networks are facing nowadays is the high and rising consumption 
level, as mentioned in [1]. Since not only population is growing exponentially, but also due to 
the fact that electricity is substituting other resources whose usage was almost electricity 
independent. Thus, it is possible to observe an increment in the requirements of energy and 
the introduction of problems to the network control, such as the reduction of the possibility 
for the network agents to find an alternative during peak hours to fulfill the energy 
requirements of the fleet in a scenario in which generators fail to work. To solve that 
problem, it would be crucial to reduce consumption during peak hours, postponing 
consumption to valley hours, where the network agents won’t face problems such as a 
demand level superior the maximum accepted demand, i.e., maximum amount of energy the 
market can provide at a certain time. Such problems can be solved using demand response 
programs. 
Demand response programs allow end-use customers to make changes in electric usage 
from their usual consumption patterns, allowing them to postpone load consumption from 
peaks hours to valley hours. In [2], DR is defined as a mechanism that enables customers to 
participate in the electric market as to improve power system efficiency and integrate 
renewable generation. However, according to [3], few DR programs are developed for 
residential customers. Nevertheless, the development of technologies related to the smart 
grids, such as smart metering, were considerably developed during last years, leading the 
residential DR to increase in terms of attractiveness due to the potential these programs may 
bring, as mentioned in [4]. As mentioned in [5], a smarter control of the residential loads will 
lead to a more efficient energy management strategy for the customers. 
As an incentive for the customers, the price to pay for energy during the valley hours is 
lower than the price during peak hours. Allied to that fact, the higher the quantity 
demanded, the higher the price to pay for an energy unit. Therefore, demand response will 
give customers the possibility to have a more balanced load pattern throughout the day, 
reducing the energy usage cost and reducing consumption during peak hours.  
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Some DR strategies are presented in [6-9] as to solve problems related to peak load 
shedding problems and shifting problems. Other strategies used in the United States for 
commercial and industrial customers are direct load control, real-time pricing, and time-of-
use programs, as mentioned in [10]. 
The goal of this thesis is to model a decentralized scheme considering responsive 
demands, i.e., implementing a market strategy in which the DR-enabled customers will bid 
into the market according to their energy requirements, and the market will answer 
according to their bids, similar to the model presented in [11] for electric vehicles. 
This strategy will be based on a cost-minimization strategy of the consumer’s 
consumption. Two of those strategies are the centralized and the decentralized approaches, 
mentioned in [11]. In which concerns to the results, regarding the energy costs, both schemes 
lead to good results. The central model considers a central agent, denoted as the aggregator, 
that controls the consumption of the end-users directly, guaranteeing the satisfaction of the 
demand and the cost minimization. Centralized schemes rely on bi-directional communication 
between the end-users and the aggregator agent. For them to participate in the market, the 
DR-enabled customer’s information is sent to a central level, where the energy consumption 
is scheduled and the control signals from the aggregator are sent to the users. Despite the 
fact that this approach leads to optimal costs, it is not useful for large fleets, since a huge 
number of users would lead to complex fleets, being the information difficult for them to 
process, as mentioned in [11]. To overcome the mentioned problem, the fleet constraints will 
be represented in an aggregated way such as in [12-16]. 
On the other side, the decentralized approaches have lower communication 
requirements, being enough to broadcast the price in order to control the consumption, as 
demonstrated in [17-20] in the approach used for electric vehicles. However, undesirable 
outcomes can occur, like the possibility of simultaneous reactions, such as the avalanche 
effects, or errors in forecasting the consumers’ attitude in relation to the price signals. This 
happens due to the fact that the impact of the DR-enabled customer’s bids is not taken into 
account. To avoid the mentioned undesirable outcomes, bidirectional communication will be 
considered in the decentralized approach. Despite the rising of the communication 
requirements, the load synchronization problems will be overcome by the usage of a bidding 
process, such as in [21], or an iterative process such as in [22-23]. Each end-user places its 
bids according to their energy requirements, and the market answers to the bids by 
communicating the clearing price. 
The customer’s sensitivity to the market prices will be represented in this work by the 
introduction of a bidding process similar to the one presented in [11], in which each end-user 
will define its energy demand bid according to its requirements. It will be established a multi-
agent system, in which each consumer will optimize its cost, similarly to the decentralized 
model. The system will be modeled within three levels. In the lower level, each customer will 
represent its willingness to buy energy by placing bids that represent the status of the 
consumers.  
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At the intermediate level, bids will be aggregated by the aggregator agent. In the upper 
level, aggregated bids are received and the market clearing will be performed. The market 
clearing price will be communicated to the aggregator agent, that will inform it the 
customers, leading them to buy energy according to their demand bid curves, being those 
bids represented in a three-step piecewise linear function such as in [24].  
The different agents’ bids are divided in three steps. The first one represents the 
inflexible demand, i.e., the critical loads as defined in [25], being the agents able to pay any 
amount of money to serve those loads. The second and third steps exist to allow the agents to 
buy energy to serve the shiftable loads throughout the day, and according to the market 
clearing price. The price regarding those two steps is defined according to the urgency of the 
agents to purchase energy, and is defined similarly to [11] and [24].  
As to adapt the bids to the market prices, two constant variables, defining an action-
pair, will modify the price of the two bid blocks regarding the flexible loads. As in [11] and 
similarly to [26], the two variables modify the price agents are willing to pay for energy 
according to their energy requirements.  
By modifying these variables agents learn how to place bids optimally. To lead the agent 
on learning the optimal actions, a reinforcement learning algorithm will be introduced. The 
reinforcement learning algorithm applied in this work consists in the Q-learning algorithm, 
first developed by Watkins in [27]. 
The bids are aggregated by horizontal summation of all agents’ bids at the intermediate 
level by the aggregator agent, as in [12].  After the bids aggregation, the market clearing will 
be performed as in [28] and [11]. The price is communicated to the aggregator agents, who 
will then transmit the information to the individual agents. The quantity of energy purchased 
by each agent is defined according to the market clearing price and the previously defined 
demand bids. 
By the usage of the Q-learning algorithm, agents try a different set of actions a sufficient 
number of times, choosing the ones that minimize the cost of purchasing energy optimally. 
The usage of a -greedy policy, such as in [29], serves to guide agents as to either exploit or 
explore, leading them to firstable try agents randomly, and afterwards to exploit the most 
profitable actions. In order to test the efficiency of the model developed in this thesis, the 
results obtained throughout the usage of the developed model will be compared to the ones 
obtained in an approach without demand response, and the results obtained with a 
centralized scheme. Three different levels of DR penetration will be considered, as to 
observe the evolution of the impact of the shiftable side of the demand in the prices, traded 
volumes and consumption profiles. 
In which concerns to the expected results, as in the electric vehicles example presented 
in [11], it is expected for the costs of purchasing energy from the new decentralized model of 
this work to be similar to the ones obtained with a centralized model, slightly higher, and 
considerably better than the results obtained with an approach without DR. 
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Thus, the importance of this work resides on creating an alternative to the centralized 
models, solving problems such as scalability and privacy and to the decentralized models 
relying on unidirectional communication, that don’t consider the impact of the DR bids in 
prices, leading to undesirable outcomes such as load synchronization problems. The new 
decentralized model developed in this work is not only modelized as to reduce the cost of 
buying energy, but also to lead to a more uniform load diagram, avoiding high levels of 
consumption during peak hours. 
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Chapter 2 
 
State-of-the-Art 
 
 
 
Since the technologies related with power systems are developing exponentially, such as 
the possibility of the end-users to use smart meters and participate in DR programs, the 
management of the electrical networks will face many challenges, introducing new elements 
to the networks, such as the electric vehicles, photovoltaic and wind power. 
The traditional top-to-bottom operation will be replaced by bidirectional 
communication, making it possible to the end-users not only to send information to the 
network, but also to sell power to the grid, creating new scenarios that will require the 
development of new approaches to deal with the crescendo in traded information. 
In the traditional approach, demand was considered to be inelastic, and the supply was 
dispatched to match the demand. End-users would consume energy regardless the market 
prices, by submitting a quantity without putting a maximum price on it, telling the market 
that they consider the value of electricity to be infinite, as mentioned in [26]. This type of 
behavior would lead to a huge amount of demanded quantity of energy during peak hours, 
associated with higher costs of electricity usage. 
To overcome those problems, a new operation model will be required for dealing with all 
the new features introduced in smart grids, such as the connection with decentralized 
demand-supply users. This operation model will consider recent features, such as the 
possibility of end-users to have access to demand response programs, leading to a more 
efficient usage of the grid and generation assets. 
As for the infrastructure to be controlled and managed in all its complexity, an 
intelligent system will be required to match demand and supply in real time, such as the MAS. 
The MAS meet these requirements, being its coordination alongside a MBC scheme well 
suitable for allowing the different agents to optimize their decision-making process. 
Individual bids are defined at the lower level, sent to the intermediate level as to be 
aggregated, being the market clearing performed at the upper level. Actions are defined and 
tested throughout the usage of the Q-learning algorithm.  
This chapter serves to introduce the state-of-art related with this work, presenting the 
theoretical development to achieve the expected results and the associated methodologies. 
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2.1. MAS 
 
Multi-Agent Systems allow the management of complex systems, modeled as groups of 
intelligent agents capable of interacting with their environment, being also capable to adapt 
their behaviors accordingly. 
Thus, MAS can be used in a huge variety of fields, such as market simulation, network 
control, or automation. An example of the usage of MAS in electrical distribution in net 
controls is presented in [30]. According to [30], a multi-agent system is a system that 
considers two or more agents. There is no overall system goal, only the local goals of the 
different agents are considered. 
The three concepts that Wooldridge uses to define MAS are agent, environment and 
autonomy. Agents are defined as merely software, or even hardware, that can be placed in a 
specific environment, reacting to its changes autonomously. Their function is to represent an 
entity, such as the DR end-users. 
Environment is defined as all the external elements to an agent, allowing the agent to 
modify it throughout their interaction. The environment shall be measurable as for the agents 
to be able to be aware of the impact of their action in the environment. 
The concept of autonomy is related to the capability of the agents to adapt and answer 
to different environment states. Wooldridge also states a differentiation between agents and 
intelligent agents. Meanwhile both different types of agents have the capability to react to 
changes in its environment, intelligent agents also have not only the capability of being pro-
active, presenting goal directed communication, but also social ability, i. e., capability to 
interact with other intelligent agents. In [21] there is another example of the usage of MAS in 
electrical networks. It is referred that even though MAS are highly complex, with a big level 
of intelligence, the complexity of the agents won’t evolve to a complex level as well. It is 
also referred that a way to make the process more efficient is to interact with an electricity 
market. Thus, a Market-Based Control scheme will be presented. 
 
2.2. Market-Based Control 
 
MBC is considered as a control strategy based on the micro-economy demand-supply 
model for price determination.  
Regarding this theory, the different agents of the system compete for resources by 
allocating bids to the market, being the assignment of the resource determined by the market 
clearing price.  
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In [21], it is presented a scenario in which multiple agents behave differently from other 
agents, being the agents of this model defined as devices, such as shiftable, stochastic and 
storage devices. In this papers’ approach, it is shown the combination between MAS and MBC 
as to control the multiple agents In which concerns to the scalability problem related with 
the centralized approaches, MBC is demonstrated to lead to a solution regarding that aspect, 
as MBC has low communication requirements. While the market clearing price remains as the 
control signal, information such as the agents’ bids is defined and grouped as to optimize the 
cost reduction. 
Reference [31] presents a market-based mechanism for scheduling short term energy 
consumption. It is presented a scheme considering an aggregator agent to be the 
intermediate between the individual agents and the control market. In this approach, a high 
number of distributed agents serves to justify the usage of a market-based control. The 
management of the decentralized resources is proven to be allowed by the MBC presented in 
this paper. 
2.2.3. Privacy 
 
As mentioned in [11], one important issue to consider about bi-directional control is the 
privacy issue. In bi-directional control schemes such as the centralized control, end-users 
need to share private information such as their load profiles, leading the central agent to 
have access to their personal information. 
In the bi-directional control scheme developed in this work, the only information sent 
from the consumers is their individual demand bids, representing the quantity of energy they 
want to purchase and the price they are willing to pay for that amount of energy. The bids 
don’t contain personal information, and privacy is no longer an issue. 
 
2.3. Market-Based Control Scheme 
 
Concepts such as MAS and MBC were presented on the last subsections, being referred 
that the interaction of both would lead to a well-established coordination of the agents of the 
system, providing a good control strategy to manage a highly complex system. This chapter 
serves to introduce a description of the appliance of both concepts in a scenario in which 
agents have the possibility to participate in DR programs. 
In this subsection, the control scheme developed in the present work is presented, as 
well as the different agents, considering the concepts of MAS and MBC. The MAS was modeled 
within three layouts or levels. The upper level is represented by the electricity market. The 
intermediate level is represented by the aggregator agent, whose function is to act as an 
intermediate between the lower level and the upper level. The lower level consists on all the 
end-users that can participate in the DR programs. A scheme representing the three different 
levels is presented on Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 - Communication between the MAS levels 
MBC is defined as a control strategy based on the micro-economy theory of demand-
supply. According to this theory and the concept of MAS, the agents of the system compete 
for resources by setting their bids according to their willingness to buy energy. Those bids are 
aggregated at the intermediate level. Afterwards, the aggregated bids are communicated to 
the higher level, where the market clearing is performed. 
The market clearing will lead to the determination of the market clearing price, that will 
be communicated in the opposite direction, i.e., to the lower level. The market equilibrium 
price will serve as the control signal for the end-users, whose amount of energy to buy will be 
set accordingly to the equilibrium price and their individual demand bids. 
 
2.4. Load profiles 
 
Since the scheme of this work is directed to residential loads, those household loads will 
be classified into two categories: controllable loads and critical loads, similarly to [25]. 
Critical loads are the loads that cannot be controlled, i.e., loads that must mandatorily 
be served at every time-step, otherwise major impacts will be observed in the consumer’s 
lifestyle. Loads such as lightning and refrigeration are part of this type of loads. 
On the other side, controllable loads consist in loads that can be controlled without 
major impacts on the end-user’s lifestyle. Loads such as HVAC systems, clothes dryer, or 
water heatercan be served at several different times without causing much impact on the 
end-user’s lifestyle. Thus, this type of loads can be seen as loads shiftable in time. Figure 2.2 
presents a typical load profile to be used in this work.   
Market
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Figure 2.2 - Typical household consumption profile 
 
In [25], a target control function for each house is defined, being adapted to this work 
and presented in below: 
𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓 + 𝑃𝐶 ≤ 𝑃𝐿 (1) 
 
   𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓 = ∑ 𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓,𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (2) 
 
  𝑃𝐶 = ∑ 𝑃𝐶,𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (3) 
 
Where: 
• Pshif – sum of all controllable/shiftable loads i; 
• PC – sum of all critical loads i; 
• PL – maximum power a user can withdraw from the network. 
Thus, the willingness of each agent to buy energy will have this formulation into account, 
considering that each agent needs to purchase at every given time step an amount of energy 
between the sum of all its critical loads at the current time-step and the maximum power 
they can withdraw from the net. 
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2.5. DR agents 
 
The DR agents correspond to all the end-users participating on DR programs. Each agent 
has its own energy consumption pattern, in which both critical loads and shiftable loads are 
considered. 
The agent’s goal is to minimize their overall consumption cost by setting their bids 
accordingly to their urgency for buying energy. Throughout the cost optimization process, 
they need to learn how to place bids optimally as for them to compete with the other agents, 
taking advantage of the fact that a considerable part of their loads can be shifted in time. 
 
2.5.1. Demand bids definition 
 
As mentioned in [11], one of the major problems of the decentralized control schemes 
relying on unidirectional communication is that the impact of the DR bids in the prices are not 
taken into account, leading to problems such as load synchronization. Therefore, also 
similarly to [11] and [21], the load synchronization problems related to the decentralized 
control scheme relying on unidirectional communication are surpassed with the introduction 
of a bidding process. 
This bidding process consists on defining bids for each individual agent, representing 
their willingness to buy energy, according to the market equilibrium price. 
In [32] it is presented a descending temperature-price bidding curve considering demand 
response, in which the price to pay for electricity is related to the actual temperature of the 
household. In [26] a piecewise linear curve with ten different fixed price ranges is presented.  
A three step piecewise linear curve is presented in [11] and [24]. The presented bid 
curve’s first step is associated to the maximum price allowed in the market, being the other 
two steps associated to the urgency-dependent prices. 
Even though the curve presented in [26] could lead to cost reduction, the piecewise 
linear curves presented in [11] and [24] not only are more urge-for-energy related but also 
raise the convergence speed of the learning code, as more blocks lead to a slower iterative 
process. Similarly to the bid curves in the mentioned papers, the bid function will be set in 
two different intervals.  
The first one represents the inelastic demand interval, which in this work corresponds to 
the interval related to the critical loads. 
The second interval corresponds to the flexible interval of the curve. This interval 
represents the willingness of the end-users to buy energy. It corresponds to a linear relation 
similar to the corner priority of the electric vehicles presented in [24]. In this interval, two 
different steps are considered, allowing two degrees of freedom. 
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The piecewise linear curve represented by three different steps is defined as in (4). 
 
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) =  {  
𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 0 ≤ 𝑃 ≤  𝑃𝐶    
𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 , 𝑃𝐶  ≤ 𝑃 ≤  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡  
𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡 , 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝑃 ≤  𝑃𝐿  
 (4) 
 
Both energy and price values defining the demand curve are based on state variables of 
the DR end-users’ household, being those values related to the different hourly time steps. 
pmax corresponds to the maximum price allowed in the market, i.e., the maximum possible 
price to pay for energy. 
The pstate variable, similarly to its definition in [11] and [24], represents the urgency of 
the DR end-users to buy energy. In these papers, pstate is defined as a fraction between the 
energy that needs to be purchased and the maximum possible amount of energy to buy before 
the departure of the vehicles. However, household DR end-users load profiles are 
considerably different, as for vehicles are able to store energy throughout the usage of 
batteries. 
Meanwhile vehicles are able not to participate in the market in scenarios in which their 
battery is fully loaded, as an example, DR end-users have the necessity to participate in the 
market at every time-step, as for they do not only have critical loads to be served at every 
hour, being impossible to postpone the serving of those loads without causing major impacts 
on the end-users’ lifestyle. 
Vehicles have many different times ranges during which a certain amount of energy can 
be delivered, being the delivery of that energy flexible. The comprise of all the planning 
horizons may not be twenty-four hours, since vehicles may not need to participate in the 
market at every time step. 
On the other side, household DR end-users’ time ranges comprise the whole day, as for 
they have to participate in the market at every hour. In [26], a demand-type considering 
shiftable demand and its cost minimization formulation are presented. 
Regarding this demand-type, the shiftable demand, which in this work is represented by 
the controllable loads, requires a certain quantity of electricity to be delivered within a given 
time range, being flexible regarding to the time of delivery within that range. 
Consumers divide the planning horizon into multiple time ranges, with a restriction for 
the amount of energy to be delivered within that time range, i.e., the sum of the delivered 
electricity during the hours comprising the time range has to meet the total amount of energy 
to be bought within that time range. 
In which concerts to this work, multiple time ranges could be considered. However, to 
simplify the bidding strategy, a single time range of twenty-four hours will be considered, 
making it necessary for all shiftable loads to be served within that time range. The 
formulation regarding the pstate is presented next. 
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𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑡
𝑇
∗  
𝑃𝐶
𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑆
𝑡
𝑃𝐿
 (5) 
 
The time-step is defined by the variable t. The variable T represents the twenty-four 
hour time range. PTS represents the total amount of shiftable loads to be served throughout 
the time range. The value of PTS decreases as the agents buy energy. Thus, its value is also 
related to the time-step, being its value either equal or smaller when compared to its 
previous time-step value. 
PC defines the value the agent has to be connected at to satisfy all its critical loads at 
the current time-step. PL represents the maximum power an agent can withdraw from the 
network. The goal of the formulation of pstate is to create a price to measure the urgency of 
the agent to buy energy. 
The time fraction included in the formulation induces that as the end of the day is 
approaching, buying energy becomes more urgent, as there is less time to fulfil all shiftable 
loads. The variable PC is included in the formulation to distinguish agents that at a certain 
time-step want to buy the same amount of shiftable energy, but have different willingness in 
which concerns to buy energy to satisfy the critical loads. 
Thus, the higher the amount of energy an agent wants to buy, the higher they set their 
pstate. Also, as the end of the day approaches, the bigger their willingness to buy energy is. 
Regarding the other variables of the demand formulation, pint is an intermediate point 
between pstate and 0. Pint is defined as in below: 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑡 =  
(𝑃𝐿
𝑡 + 𝑃𝐶
𝑡)
2
 (6) 
 
This approach for defining the demand bid curve and its variables is similar to the one in 
[1]. Thus, the only values for the agents to determine to their bids are PTS and pstate, being all 
of the other values dependable on these ones. The demand bidding curve considering all 
these variables is presented in Figure 2.3. Considering the different types of demand bidding 
curves, two distinguished curves were cons idered regarding the status of the household end-
users. The first type consists on consumers that have more urgency on buying energy, i.e., 
end-users that still have shiftable loads to serve. The typical bid curve for this type of users 
in presented in Figure 2.3. 
The second type consists on users that already bought enough energy throughout the day 
and have no need to buy energy to satisfy the controllable loads. Thus, a single block bid 
curve will be defined for these type of consumers, being the value of pstate and consequently 
pint equal to zero. In Figure 2.4, a typical bid curve for this type of costumers is presented. As 
a resume, the demand bid curves of the different users depend on their status variables. 
These status variables will define how their bid will impact in the market price, and according 
to the clearing price of the market, how much energy each agent will purchase.
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Figure 2.3 - Demand bid curve 
 
Figure 2.4 - Demand bid curve, no shiftable load 
2.5.2. Agents’ actions 
 
For the DR end-users to adapt their bids to the price in the market, a set of actions must 
be taken in order to measure the sensitivity of their energy requirements and adapt it into a 
price. In [33], a pricing function in which the cost of purchasing energy is dependent on the 
level of consumption is presented. The price function takes into account the effect of the 
customers’ consumption level so the customers will have a multiple price rating according to 
their consumption level. The formulation considers two different positive constant variables. 
One of the variables is independent of any other variables, and the second one is multiplied 
to the customers’ consumption and their consumption level.  
price
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pstate
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A similar approach that is even more adaptable to this work is presented in [11]. 
Similarly to the previous approach, the formulation in this paper also considers two constants, 
being the second one multiplied to pstate. Thus, the value of pstate is adapted considering an 
independent constant variable, and another constant multiplied to pstate. The adapted 
formulation is presented in below. 
𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝐵1 + 𝐵2 ∗ (
𝑡
𝑇
∗ 
𝑃𝐶
𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑆
𝑡
𝑃𝐿
) (7) 
 
In this scenario, B1 represents the agents’ interest on buying energy, i.e., the price that 
agents consider to be low enough to purchase energy even if there is no urge to buy it. B2 
represents the sensitivity to the urge of buying energy of the willingness to buy electricity. 
Meanwhile the state variables are energy-requirement dependent, actions may have a wider 
range of values previously defined. Changes in the values of the actions will lead to the 
optimization of the energy costs. By modifying the values of B1 and B2, agents will learn how 
to place bids optimally as to reach their cost minimization goal. For that, a machine learning 
algorithm is developed as to automatically test a wide number of actions and determine 
which actions lead to optimal solutions for minimizing the cost on purchasing electricity. 
 
2.6. Aggregator agent 
 
The aggregator agent represented at the intermediate level is a key element to integrate 
the DR bids within the rest of the bids, as mentioned in [34]. The quality of the aggregation 
process will determine the quality of the optimization process. In [35], a framework including 
the role of an aggregator agent is presented. In this framework, the function of the 
aggregator agent is to group electrical vehicles while trying to satisfy the energy 
requirements of the fleet. In [21], it is presented a scenario in which the role of the 
aggregator agent is likewise the role of a concentrator agent. The aggregator receives and 
concentrate the bids, sending them to the market afterwards. The clearing price of the 
market is sent to the end-users by the aggregator agent, leading the agents to buy energy 
depending on their individual bids and the clearing price of the market. This is the approach 
used in the work developed in this thesis. 
 
2.6.1. Aggregation process 
 
In order to optimize the cost of buying energy for the agents of the fleet, the aggregator 
has to aggregate the demand bids in a proper way as to not only meet the requirements of 
the fleet, but also to avoid misleading information to be sent to the upper level. The 
aggregated demand curve must be dimensioned in a way that approaches the costs of buying 
energy to the cost obtained with the centralized model to be presented in section 2.9.  
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As in [36], the aggregated function is a piecewise linear function. The aggregated 
demand is determined by the horizontal summation of the many different individual demand 
curves and has a number of intervals equal to the number of different prices of the individual 
demand curves. 
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the horizontal summation process of the individual demand bids. 
Considering a scenario with two demand curves as defined in Figure 2.3 in which pstate1 > pstate2 
and pint1 > pint2, are horizontally summed, the resulting curve would be similar as in the 
presented figure. The horizontal summation is done as in [37]. 
 
2.7. Reinforcement learning: Q-learning formulation 
 
This subsection serves as an introduction to the presentation of the different known 
machine learning algorithms, as well as the definition of the algorithm to use in order to lead 
agents to an optimal bidding policy. 
In [38], three different machine learning algorithms are defined: supervised learning, 
unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning. 
In supervised learning, agents learn from labeled data, being able to classify on 
beforehand the information that it is receiving. A training set will be at the agent disposal so 
the agent will be led to generate a mapping for inputs and outputs. 
On the other side, unsupervised learning consists on the agent learning from unlabeled 
data. The agent receives a large body of information, being its task to detect information 
that deviates from the average information. The so-called reinforcement learning algorithm 
consists in a machine learning algorithm whose learning process consists on analyzing the 
reward signals obtained after performing a particular action, being those rewards used for 
building a policy that allows agents to optimally choose the best future option. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 - Bid aggregation process 
price
pmax
pstate1
pstate2
pint1
pint2
PC1+PC2 PL1+PL2
Power
(...)
16 | State-of-the-Art  
 
 
 
The goal of the reinforcement learning algorithm is to maximize the reward, i.e., to 
determine the sequence of actions that will lead to optimal rewards. Q-learning is an off-
policy control algorithm, first defined by Watkins in [27]. By using this method, agents are 
able to perform different actions meanwhile they are in one of the different possible states. 
To every state-action pair, a reward will be assigned, being that assignment preserved in the 
Q-matrix and updated every time the same action is performed. The goal is to determine a 
strategy that will lead to the maximization of the different values of the Q-matrix, known as 
Q-values. 
The usage of the Q-learning algorithm is justified due to the fact that, as mentioned in 
[39], the learned action-value function Q converges to its optimal value despite the followed 
policy. Thus, the analysis of the algorithm will be considerably simplified. Even though a 
policy is still being used and has effects on determining the state-action pairs to be visited, 
only the continuity of the update and visit of the different pairs is required for the method to 
converge. 
The formulation and the algorithm of the Q-learning method will be presented in this 
chapter, as well a policy to lead agents on deciding how to choose the action to be 
performed, which in this work is the -Greedy policy. In Chapter 4, the implementation of the 
algorithm is presented, as well as the adaptation of the method to the work developed in this 
thesis. 
 
2.7.1. Q-Learning algorithm 
 
In [39], a description of the iterative process for updating Q-values is presented. 
Regarding this process, the designer firstable chooses the Q-values that correspond to each 
state-action pair. Every time an agent performs a particular action, its correspondent Q-value 
are updated. 
The Q-learning algorithm is presented as following: 
1) Initialize Q-matrix; 
2) For each episode: 
2.1) Choose a random initial state S; 
2.2) For each episode: 
     2.2.1) Choose an action A from S using a policy derived from Q (for example, -greedy 
policy); 
     2.2.2) Take action A and observe the reward R and the new state S’; 
     2.2.3) Update Q-matrix according to its formulation; 
     2.2.4) Set the state to the new state, repeating the process until reaching the final 
state. 
The formulation for updating the Q-matrix will be presented in the next subchapter. 
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2.7.2 Q-learning formulation 
 
Regarding the Q-matrix updating equation presented in [39], the update of the Q-values 
is done according to the following equation: 
𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) = 𝑄𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) + 𝛼𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) ∗ [𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛾 ∗ max
𝑎
𝑄𝑎(𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑎) − 𝑄𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡)] (8) 
 
where: 
• Qt+1(st, at) - new Q-value, i.e., the updated Q-value; 
• Qt(st, at) - old Q-value; 
• (st, at) – learning rate, varying from 0 to 1 and determining the weight of new 
information versus old information, and thus determining the convergence speed of the 
method; 
• Rt+1 – reward obtained for performing action a; 
• – discount factor, that is a weighting coefficient of future or actual rewards; 
• 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑎
𝑄𝑎(𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑎) – estimated future values. 
•  
2.7.3. -greedy policy 
 
Regarding the fact that the Q-learning algorithm provides the agent information for it to 
know which, are the most profitable actions, a policy for decision-making is required. This is 
justified by the fact that there is no decision rule associated with the process on beforehand. 
By using a Greedy policy, agents will exploit the available information, always choosing 
the actions that maximize the reward. Nevertheless, by using a regular Greedy policy, agents 
will always try the most promising actions, i.e., actions whose reward values are the highest, 
instead of exploring the remaining options. 
During the first iterations of a Q-learning algorithm, all the actions are unexplored. The 
first actions to be taken by the agents will lead their correspondent Q-values to be updated 
more times than the other remaining values. Thus, by using a greedy policy, the first actions 
to be taken will be over-explored, and the agent will not learn any new information from the 
unexplored actions. 
Therefore, a question regarding the concept of Exploration or Exploitation surges. Up to 
a certain point, agents will have to estimate if there is a need to explore more actions, or if 
it is time to exploit the actions that led to the best results so far. 
The agent has to decide between Exploration or Exploitation by measuring the certainty 
of being at the best possible state. If not, actions should keep being explored as for their 
respective Q-values to be optimized. 
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In [29], the usage of a -Greedy policy is presented. By using this policy, agents will 
choose with probability  a random available action a∈A, and with a probability of 1- the 
action that maximizes the expected reward.  
According to [29], the main reason to adopt a policy that sometimes selects an action 
believed not to lead to the highest expected reward is that by taking all the actions a 
sufficient number of times, agents are able to correctly identify which actions lead to their 
expected reward. 
As soon as the agents suppose that all the actions were taken a sufficient number of 
times, agents may then start to exploit the highest-reward’ associated actions. An algorithm 
considering the -Greedy policy is also presented in [29] regarding the usage of the mentioned 
policy in a multi-agent system. The implementation of the algorithm, as well as its adaptation 
to the work developed in this thesis, is presented in Chapter 3. 
 
2.8. Market Clearing 
 
Regarding the known decentralized schemes, agents need to receive from the upper 
level, i.e., the market, a control signal that will lead them to act in terms of buying energy. 
In a Market-Based Control strategy, the control signal is the market clearing price. This 
price is determined by the microeconomic theory of demand and supply. Differently from 
decentralized control schemes relying on unidirectional communication, the DR end-users’ 
bids will have an impact on the market price. After the market price is determined, agents 
will respond to it according to the bids they previously set. 
The price will be determined with a simple market clearing, presented in the next 
subchapter. 
 
2.8.1. Electricity Market 
 
As for the market operator to determine the market price, it has to match supply and 
demand bids, i.e., to determine a price to pay for energy that satisfies both demand and 
supply in term of quantity of energy to be satisfied/produced. The market operator’s goal is 
to maximize the social welfare, which according to the microeconomy theory happens when 
the consumer and producer surplus are maximized. 
2.8.2. Market Clearing formulation 
 
In [28], an optimization-based approach is presented and proposed for clearing the 
market in a smart grid. This approach’s formulation considers four different terms to be 
maximized, being those terms the utility for suppliers, consumers, bilateral contracts and 
electric vehicles aggregators. 
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To every one of the terms an inequality equation is associated. An equality equation is also 
present in the formulation, representing the balance of supply and demand in the grid. The 
work to be developed in this thesis doesn’t consider bilateral contracts. Also, it doesn’t 
consider the introduction of electric vehicles in the grid as well. However, electric vehicles 
behavior in the control scheme is similar to DR end-users’ behavior. Thus, a similar term to 
the one representing the electric vehicles will be considered in the market clearing 
formulation. 
Regarding the updates to be done to the formulation in [28], it is observable in [11] a 
formulation for clearing the market that not only is similar to the pretended one, but also 
applied in a similar Market-Based scheme. The formulation is presented in below. 
 
max
𝑃𝑐
𝑡.𝑃𝑎
𝑡 .𝑃𝑝
𝑡
   (∑ 𝑝𝑐
𝑡
𝑐
𝑃𝑐
𝑡 + ∑ 𝑝𝑎
𝑡
𝑎
𝑃𝑎
𝑡 − ∑ 𝑝𝑝
𝑡
𝑝
𝑃𝑝
𝑡) (9) 
 
subject to 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙
𝑡      ∀𝑙 = {𝑐, 𝑎, 𝑝} (10) 
 
∑ 𝑃𝑐
𝑡
𝑐
+  ∑ 𝑃𝑎
𝑡
𝑎
=  ∑ 𝑃𝑝
𝑡
𝑝
 (11) 
 
where: 
• Pc – accepted demand; 
• Pa – aggregated DR bids; 
• Pp – supply; 
• pc, pa and pp – price. 
The objective function to be maximized ensures that social welfare is maximized. 
Equation (10) is the inequality restriction that will ensure that the values of energy to be 
produced and served are within the acceptable limits. 
Equation (11) is the equality equation to ensure the balance between demand and 
supply. 
In Figure 2.6 the resolution of the market clearing problem is presented visually. The 
descending curve represents the demand, while the ascending curve represents the supply. 
Maximizing the social welfare consists on maximizing the area between the demand and 
supply curves, i.e., determining the intersection between orange and blue curves. The 
intersection point is defined by the quantity to be produced/purchased in every time step and 
the market clearing price.  
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The market clearing price is determined as in [40]. 
 
Figure 2.6 - Market clearing example 
 
2.9. Centralized approach 
 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the new decentralized scheme proposed in 
this work, the results are compared to the ones obtained in a centralized market. In the 
framework pursued in this work, individual agents directly participate in the market by 
submitting their bids and respond to the market clearing price according to them. On the 
other side, in a centralized model, bidding is managed centrally by an aggregator. 
In a centralized model, aggregators bid into the market on behalf of the fleet’s 
customers. At the same time the aggregator meets the energy requirements of the fleet, it 
directly controls purchasing energy. Similarly to the decentralized approach, the goal is to 
minimize the costs of buying energy while satisfying the DR end-users’ constraints. Those 
constraints are aggregated similarly to the constraints of a virtual battery as in [11]. The 
problem is modeled as a bi-level program, i.e., the aggregator’s cost minimization problem 
represents the upper level, being the market clearing associated with the lower level, 
similarly to [11]. 
 
2.9.1. Formulation 
 
The formulation representing the cost minimization problem associated with the upper 
level considers not only the minimization objective function, but also the constraints 
representing the aggregated constraints of all individual end-users, and is presented as 
following.  
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min
𝐸0,𝑃𝑎
𝑡
∑ 𝑝𝑡𝑃𝑎
𝑡
24
𝑡=1
 (12) 
 
Subject to: 
𝐸𝑎
𝑡 =  𝐸𝑎
𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑎
𝑡×∆𝑡 (13) 
 
𝐸𝑎
0 =  𝐸𝑎
𝑇 (14) 
 
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑎
𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑎
𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎
𝑡  (15) 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑎
𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑎
𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎
𝑡  (16) 
 
The objective function consists on minimizing the costs of purchasing energy throughout 
the day. 
Equation (13) determines the evolution of the total quantity of energy to be satisfied 
during the whole day. Equation (14) guarantees that enough energy will be purchased during 
the day. Equations (15) and (16) respectively represent the energy and power boundaries. The 
parameters regarding the power and energy constraints are determined from the individual 
consumption patterns from the considered agents. 
The lower level of the problem is represented by the market clearing problem presented 
in subsection 2.8.2, regarding equations (9) - (11). 
The connection between the upper and the lower level is represented by the Lagrange 
multiplier of the equality equation (11). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Implementation 
 
 
This chapter serves to introduce the different steps regarding the implementation of the 
different simulations. The particular application of the formulation presented in previous 
chapters is adapted in this chapter to the work developed in this thesis. All simulations were 
implemented using MATLAB and the tool Solver from Excel. 
 
3.1. Main implementation 
 
The steps regarding the implementation of the simulations are presented in below: 
1. Definition of the actions:  As the day begins, the actions to be performed by each 
individual agent are defined according to the E-Greedy policy; 
2. Definition of the bids: At the lower level, the demand bids representing the 
willingness of each individual agent to buy energy are defined; 
3. Aggregation of the bids: At the intermediate level, the bids of all individual agents 
are aggregated; 
4. Market clearing: The individual agents’ bids are integrated with the inflexible demand 
and the supply, followed by the performance of the market clearing; 
5. Updating state of consumption: Individual agents respond to the price signal according 
to their bids, and update their state of consumption accordingly. At the same time, the 
reward associated with the agent and the performed action is simultaneously updated; 
6. Updating the Q-matrix: At the end of the day, the Q-matrix is updated. A new set of 
actions is chosen for each individual agent. 
A diagram resuming all the steps is presented in Figure 3.1. 
 
3.2. Q-learning implementation 
 
The Q-learning formulation presented on section 2.7 considers agents to be in a specific 
state at every iteration. Actions are chosen according to the state in the previous iteration, 
and future rewards are taken into account when choosing the action with the highest 
associated reward. 
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Figure 3.1 - Model implementation algorithm 
 
However, the state of the agents is already considered in the bids definition, since the 
prices on the flexible demand bid blocks are defined according to the state of consumption. 
Thus, states are not considered in the Q-learning formulation. 
The consequentialism of the non-consideration of the states in the Q-learning algorithm 
regards two consequences. The first one is that future rewards aren’t considered. By not 
considering a sequence of states, rewards regarding that sequence will not exist. Thus, the 
algorithm’s formulation is updated as following: 
 
𝑄𝑡+1(𝑎𝑡) =  𝑄𝑡(𝑎𝑡) + 𝛼𝑡(𝑎𝑡) ∗ [𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝑄𝑡(𝑎𝑡)] (17) 
 
The second consequence is that rewards will be associated with the action performed by 
the agents in a particular iteration, and thus they are iteration-independent. 
Choosing  and 
defining actions
Generating demand 
bids
Aggregating bids
Initializing Q-matrix
Market clearing
Buying energy 
according to the 
market clearing price
t = 24
t < 24
Update reward and 
state of consumption 
PTS
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Therefore, the traditional Q-matrix can be updated as following.  
 
𝑄 =  [
𝑄1,1 ⋯ 𝑄1,𝑚
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑄𝑛,1 ⋯ 𝑄𝑛,𝑚
] (18) 
 
Meanwhile in a common Q-matrix the lines represent the states and the columns the set 
of possible actions, the new matrix can be resumed, for each agent, as a single line in which 
the columns keep representing the actions. In (18), n represents the set of agents, and m the 
set of possible actions. A similar simplification of the Q-learning algorithm in a MAS was 
already developed in [29] and [41]. 
 
3.2.1. Reward 
 
The formulation for calculating the reward in presented in below: 
𝑅𝑛 =  − [∑ 𝑝
𝑡
24
𝑡=1
𝑃𝑛
𝑡 + 𝑤(|𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝐸24|)] (19) 
 
The first term represents the cost of purchasing energy throughout the day, being pt the 
market clearing price in time-step t, and 𝑃𝑛
𝑡 the power agent n is connected at time-step t. 
The second term is a penalty for the agents who either fail to buy enough energy throughout 
the day or buy more than the expected amount of energy.  
This term also leads the learning algorithm to a faster determination of the actions that 
maximize the rewards, as for actions that lead agents to buy less energy than expected can 
deceptively lead the algorithm to believe those actions are in fact the one with a higher 
associated reward. In (19), Eexp represents the expected amount of energy to be bought 
throughout the day, while E24 represents the energy that was in fact purchased by the agents 
during the day. 
Another feature of the penalty term is to compensate the market for minor deviations in 
the bought quantity by each agent. Due to the nature of the demand bids, agents only have 
three steps of freedom when it is about purchasing energy. When they answer to the market 
according to their bids, agents are likely to purchase more or less energy than the accorded 
amount during the market clearing. In case the agents end up purchasing more than the 
accorded amount, a higher quantity will be set to a market clearing price that don’t 
correspond to the price. Thus, the penalty term compensates the market by the end of the 
day, as agents with deviations in the expected amount of purchased energy will pay according 
to the level of deviation.  
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3.2.2. Q-learning parameters 
 
To optimize not only the cost minimization but also the convergence of the algorithm, it 
is important to model the learning rate  and the parameter  associated with the -Greedy 
policy. During the initial iterations, in which most actions remain unexplored, a sufficiently 
high value is set to . As the actions with higher associated rewards are determined, the 
value of  will decrease, because the urge to gather more information decreases as well. 
In which concerns to the parameter , its value will determine the probability of 
exploring vs exploiting. Since it is essential for the algorithm to try all different actions a 
sufficient number of times, it is necessary to firstable explore over exploit. Thus, at the 
beginning of the iterative process,  is set to a value high enough for the mentioned purpose. 
As the optimal solutions arise, the value of  is reduced, as for exploitation to win over 
exploration, leading to the final optimal solution. A more extended analysis on determining 
the most suitable values for B1 will be presented in Appendix A. 
 
3.3. Critical and controllable loads definition 
 
In 2.4. loads are divided into two categories, critical and controllable loads. Each load 
type is divided according to the nature of the loads constituting it, i.e., critical loads consist 
on loads such as refrigeration, not being possible for the end-users to post-pone their 
consumption, and controllable loads are defined as loads such as washing machines, being 
possible for the end-users to purchase energy to satisfy this type of loads whenever they wish. 
Multiple levels for the demand bid curve presented in 2.5.1. could be considered, so the 
multiple agents could satisfy individual loads according to the market clearing price. 
However, as the goal of this work is to prove the efficiency of the model in reducing the costs 
of purchasing energy while solving problems associated with the centralized models, merely 
the summation of the loads is considered, i.e., demand is divided in two: the critical part of 
the demand, and the shiftable part of the demand. Agents buy enough energy to satisfy the 
critical load, and according to the market price they purchase energy to satisfy the shiftable 
loads. 
 
3.4. Definition of the actions 
 
A fundamental aspect of this work is to shape the demand bids in order to develop 
optimal bids so the many individual agents can diminish their energy purchasing costs. 
Considering that the agents’ bids are defined by a pair of actions to be chosen at the 
beginning of each day, it is important to define an adequate amount of actions so the agents 
may have not only a wide range of actions to opt for, but mostly to avoid non-optimal results. 
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According to the equation (20), the willingness to pay for a certain amount of energy is 
not only defined by their individual requirements, but also by the actions defined by the 
parameters’ pair B1/B2. 
 
𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝐵1 + 𝐵2 ∗ (
𝑡
𝑇
∗  
𝑃𝐶
𝑡 + 𝑃𝑇𝑆
𝑡
𝑃𝐿
) (20) 
 
Regarding Figure 2.6, these parameters determine the impact of the aggregated bids 
blocks in the market clearing price. If the parameters are dimensioned to low values, agents 
might fail to purchase energy. If the parameters have high values, agents are led to buy high 
values of energy as the day begins, increasing the competition for resource during the first 
hours of the day, and therefore leading to a huge variation between maximum and minimum 
value of purchased energy throughout the day. Thus, an adequate approach on correctly 
defining the mentioned parameters will be presented as for the individual agents to achieve 
their goal. 
 
3.4.1 Defining B1 
 
The parameter B1 represents the agents’ willingness to buy energy even if their 
requirements are considered to be low. According to [11], the higher the agent sets its value 
for the similar parameter bv , the more likely it is to quickly purchase enough energy to satisfy 
the agents’ needs, needs that in this work are represented by the amount of shiftable 
demand to satisfy throughout the day. Thus, defining B1 is similar to defining B2 in terms of 
impact in the optimality of the results. 
However, a rule for defining values for B1 is defined. Since B1 is a constant value that 
serves to modify pstate and is not affected by a fraction, the parameter is defined taking into 
account the market clearing prices. Regarding the fact that the agents’ goal is to diminish the 
costs of buying energy, it won’t be willing to pay a higher value than the maximum clearing 
price of the market. Also, it is expected that the market clearing prices will raise during 
valley hours, as the goal of the individual agents is to purchase energy during those hours. 
Therefore, the minimum value to consider for B1 should not be lower than the clearing price 
of the market, since that could lead the agents to fail on buying energy.  
In Figure 3.2, it is possible to observe the clearing prices of the market in an approach 
without considering demand response. The clearing prices of the market in this scenario vary 
from 7.76 to 91.62 €/MWh. Thus, the range of values to attribute to B1 must be between 
those values.  A more extended analysis on determining the most suitable values for B1 will be 
presented in Appendix A. 
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Figure 3.2 - Market clearing price without DR 
 
3.4.2. Defining B2 
 
According to its definition in Equation (20), B2 serves to measure the sensitivity to the 
consumption urgency. Thus, properly attribute to this parameter an adequate range of values 
is highly important. 
Low values of B2 lead to an inadequate attributed importance to the agents’ willingness 
to buy energy, leading them to fail on buying enough energy to satisfy their requirements. 
High values of B2 lead to high prices in the second and third bid blocks presented on 
Figure 2.3 in subsection 2.5.1., leading the agents to purchase an inadequate amount of 
energy considerably fast, pushing agents not only to non-optimal results, but also to high 
peaks of demand from DR end-users during certain time steps.  
A more extended analysis on determining the most suitable values for B2 will be 
presented in Appendix A. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Results 
 
 
 
The goal of this work is to model a decentralized market-based scheme considering 
demand response relying on bidirectional communication. To test the efficiency of the model, 
its results are compared to the ones obtained by modeling a centralized scheme and to the 
results obtained with an approach without demand response. 
As to test the influence of the DR penetration level on the optimization of the results, 
three different DR penetration levels will be considered. The first one is 30 %, a situation in 
which DR starts having a noticeable impact not only in the market prices but also the load 
diagram of the fleet considering DR. The second one is 15 %, a situation expected to be 
observable in a near future. The third one is 60 %, a situation in which DR dominates over the 
inflexible demand part of the fleet.  
A fleet of 100 loads is considered as to demonstrate the new decentralized model. Both 
demand and supply don’t change from one iteration to another, as the goal is to test and 
define the actions that optimize the cost reduction. 
 
4.1. 30% DR penetration 
 
The first scenario tested in the base case considers a level of 30 % DR penetration. 
Regarding the DR level and the model developed in this work, the impact of the DR program 
in the prices, traded volumes and consumption profiles is observed and discussed in below, as 
well as the evolution of the average cost of purchasing energy, the evolution of the reward 
and also errors entailed with the model of this work. 
• Market Clearing Price: 
As a mean of interpretation of the changes in traded volumes and consumption profiles, 
the impact of introducing the DR program developed in this work to 30 % of the fleet in the 
market clearing prices is analyzed. Figure 4.1 presents the market clearing prices throughout 
the day both in the scenario without DR and the decentralized scheme developed in this 
thesis.
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Figure 4.1 - Market clearing price, 30% DR penetration 
 
As expected, the market clearing prices during valley hours raised, meanwhile during 
peak hours they diminished. The variation between the minimum clearing price of the market 
and the maximum value diminish when using a decentralized market-based scheme. This 
happens due to the fact that the market clearing price is influenced by the quantity of energy 
demanded at every time-step. DR programs lead end-users participating in the programs to 
demand more energy when the prices to pay for it is lower. Thus, DR end-users demand a 
higher quantity during valley hours, which will raise the clearing price of the market during 
those hours. Since end-users fulfil their energy requirements during valley hours, their 
demanded quantity during peak hours is lower, leading the quantity demanded, introduced 
with the rest of the inflexible demand of the fleet, to be lower, and therefore diminishing the 
price during peak hours. 
Table 4.1 presents the variation between minimum and maximum clearing price in both 
approaches. As it can be observable, using the DR model developed in this work leads to a 
reduction of the variation between the maximum and the minimum of 35.28 %, when 
compared to an uncontrolled approach. 
For further analysis, the next subsection presents the consumption profiles of the 30% of 
the fleet participating in the DR program developed in this work. 
 
Table 4.1 - Variation between maximum and minimum MCP, 30 % DR penetration, in €/MWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 30 % DR 
Min 7,76 18,70 
Max 91,62 72,98 
Max - Min 83,86 54,28 
Variation (%) 35,28% 
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• Consumption profiles: 
 
Regarding the 30 end-users participating in the DR program developed in this work, the 
cost of purchasing energy without demand response and considering 30 % DR penetration are 
compared in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.1 presents the change in the market clearing prices influenced by a variation in 
the demand throughout the day. As expected, it is possible to observe that DR end-users tend 
to purchase energy when it is cheaper.  
DR agents buy energy according to their demand bids and the market clearing price. The 
first six hours of the day comprise the hours in which energy is cheaper. Thus, the willingness 
of the end-users to buy energy during these hours is higher than in the rest of the day, 
leading them to maximize the purchasing of energy during the first hours of the day, as it is 
possible to observe in Figure 4.2. 
Table 4.2 presents the variation between minimum and maximum energy bought in both 
approaches. As it can be observable, using the DR model developed in this work leads to a 
reduction of the variation between the maximum and the minimum of 32.74 %, when 
compared to an uncontrolled approach. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 - Purchased energy, 30 % DR penetration 
 
 
Table 4.2 - Variation between maximum and minimum quantity of bought energy, 30 % DR 
penetration, in kWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 30 % DR 
Min 20,74 5,48 
Max 176,86 110,49 
Max - Min 156,12 105,01 
Variation (%) 32,74% 
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• Traded volumes: 
Considering that one of the goals of introducing DR to end-users is to diminish the 
variation between the maximum and minimum traded volume, leading to less demand during 
peak hours, the impact of introducing 30 % of the fleet to the DR program of this work is 
analyzed. Figure 4.3 shows the traded volumes both without demand response and 
considering the scenario of this subsection. As it can be observable, the introduction of 30 % 
of the fleet to the DR program developed in this work reduces the overall consumption of 
energy during peak hours and raises the consumption during valley hours, as pretended. 
Table 4.3 presents the variation between minimum and maximum energy bought in both 
approaches.  
As it can be observable, without demand response, the traded volumes throughout the 
day vary from 56.34 kWh to 611.60 kWh, and with the scheme developed in this work, the 
traded volumes vary from 142.57 kWh to 487.11 kWh. Thus, the model developed in this work 
demonstrates to be effective in which concerns to diminish the variation between maximum 
and minimum value of traded volumes, as the variation using the DR model of this work leads 
to a reduction of 37.95 % between maximum and minimum when compared to an uncontrolled 
approach.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 - Traded volumes, 30% DR penetration 
 
Table 4.3 - Variation between maximum and minimum traded volumes, 30 % DR penetration, in 
kWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 30 % DR 
Min 56,34 142,58 
Max 611,60 487,11 
Max - Min 555,26 344,53 
Variation (%) 37,95% 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Tr
ad
ed
 v
o
lu
m
es
 (
kW
h
)
Time (h)
Inflexible demand Decentralized
30% DR penetration | 33 
 
33 
 
• Costs of purchasing energy: 
The average cost of the purchased energy by the agents is calculated throughout the 
following formulation: 
 
∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑡241
𝑛
1
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑡241
𝑛
1
 (21) 
 
As a benchmark to compare the effectiveness of the model developed in this work, the 
average cost will be compared to the average cost in the approach without demand response.  
In Figure 8.4 it is possible to observe the average cost of purchasing energy throughout the 
iterative process.  
The cost tends to vary considerably while the agents are still testing the many possible 
actions. As the agents start identifying the optimal actions, the costs of purchasing energy 
diminish considerably to an amount of approximately 29.75 €/MWh. In which concerns to the 
average cost of buying energy in a scenario without demand response, the average cost as a 
constant value of 48.37 €/MWh. Thus, it can be concluded that the DR model developed in 
this work leads to a considerable cost reduction, especially when agents determine the most 
profitable actions. 
 
• Error: 
 
Since the different agents of the fleet purchase energy taking into account their 
previously defined demand bids and the market clearing price, an error entailed with that 
method is expected, as it can be seen in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Average cost of purchasing energy 
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Figure 4.5 - Cost of purchasing energy 
As it can be observable, the variance between the expected value of energy to purchase 
and the real value is not severely significant. Figure 4.6 show the variation between Eexp and 
E24 in terms of percentage. As it can be seen, during some hours of the day, the variation 
between both values is considerable, such as in hour 6. Plus, analyzing the variation it is 
observable that most of the times the agents of the fleet purchase more energy than the 
expected quantity, leading the market to sell energy cheaper than the accorded amount, as 
agents purchase a superior quantity than previously defined. However, the penalty term 
established in Chapter 3 in Equation (18) is used so the different agents of the fleet can 
compensate the market either when they fail to purchase energy or when they purchase more 
than the established amount.  
Another feature of the penalty term is its optimal solution leading aspect, i.e., solutions 
in which agents buy less energy than it was supposed or buy more for an unfair price to the 
market will lead to smaller rewards, leading the agent to prefer actions with the minimum 
possible deviation from the expected amount of energy to purchase. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 - Variation between assigned quantity of energy and purchased quantity of energy 
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• Evolution of the reward: 
 
The evolution of the reward throughout the iterative process will determine the 
optimality of the obtained results, as a lack of convergence in the iterative process lead to 
sub-optimal results. 
Figure 4.7 demonstrates the evolution of the fleet’s reward throughout the iterative 
process. During the first iterations of the process, agents test new actions to learn which 
actions might lead them to higher rewards. As the agents starts to learn which actions are 
more profitable, the agents start choosing the actions that demonstrate to possibly be the 
optimal actions. By the end of the iterative process, agents seem to have reached the optimal 
actions, as the value of the total reward of the fleet tends to converge. 
 
4.1.1. Centralized vs. Decentralized scheme 
 
Considering that one of the goals of this work is to validate the developed decentralized 
scheme as a reliable alternative to the centralized schemes, a comparison between both 
schemes is presented. 
Figure 8.8 presents the consumption profile of the part of the fleet considering the DR 
program of this work in both scenarios.  
In the decentralized model, the aggregator has perfect information about the fleet 
requirements at every time step, and thus it reduces the cost of purchasing energy of the 
fleet optimally. As it can be observed, the load profile under a centralized approach is similar 
to the profile obtained with the scheme developed in this work, validating the decentralized 
model as a good alternative to the centralized model on buying energy. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 - Evolution of the reward of the 30 % of the fleet considering DR 
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Figure 4.8 - Purchased energy, 30 % DR penetration 
 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 demonstrate that the decentralized scheme of this work leads to a 
considerably small deviation between the market clearing price and traded volumes 
throughout the day.  
 
 
Figure 4.9 - Market clearing price, 30 % DR penetration 
 
 
Figure 4.10 - Traded volumes, 30 % DR penetration 
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Table 4.4 presents the costs of purchasing energy per unit for the fleet considering DR. It 
shows that the results obtained with the decentralized scheme do not differ considerably 
from the results obtained with a centralized scheme.  
 
Table 4.4 - Average cost of purchasing energy, decentralized vs. centralized model, in €/MWh 
Decentralized model Centralized model 
29,75 28,10 
 
4.2. 15% DR penetration 
 
In the second DR scenario to be tested, a level of 15% DR penetration is considered. This 
value represents a scenario that is realistic in a near future, in which the possibility to 
participate in DR programs by the end-users has risen enough to lead the market to be 
influenced by the considered level.  
 
• Market Clearing Price: 
Figure 4.11 presents the market clearing price for the scenario in which all the loads of 
the fleet are inflexible and the scenario in which 15 % of the agents participate in the DR 
program developed in this work. As expected, the introduction of 15 % to the DR program of 
this work led to a reduction in the market clearing price during peak hours and to a raise 
during valley hours. 
 The difference between maximum and minimum clearing price is reduced by 18.01 % by 
using the DR model of this work, when comparing to the inflexible demand approach, as it 
can be observable in Table 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 - Market clearing price, 15 % DR penetration 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
M
ar
ke
t 
cl
ea
ri
n
g 
p
ri
ce
(€
/M
W
h
)
Time (h)
Inflexible demand Decentralized
38 | Results  
 
 
 
Table 4.5 - Variation between maximum and minimum MCP, 15 % DR penetration, in €/MWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 15 % DR 
Min 7,74 13,38 
Max 91,60 82,14 
Max -Min 83,86 68,76 
Variation (%) 18,01% 
 
• Consumption profiles: 
Figure 4.12 shows the purchased energy of the 15 % of the fleet considered in this 
analysis, without demand response and considering the decentralized DR scheme of this work. 
In terms of variation between the maximum and minimum value of purchased energy 
throughout the day, using the DR model of this work leads to a reduction of the variance 
between maximum and minimum amount of purchased energy by 21.30 % when compared to 
the uncontrolled approach, as it can be seen in Table 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 - Purchased energy, 15 % DR penetration 
 
Table 4.6 - Variation between maximum and minimum quantity of bought energy, 15 % DR 
penetration, in kWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 15 % DR 
Min 7,61 2,65 
Max 88,70 66,47 
Max - Min 81,09 63,82 
Variation (%) 21,30% 
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• Traded volumes: 
Figure 4.13 presents the traded volumes for the scenario without demand response and 
for the scenario considering 15 % of the fleet to be participating in the decentralized DR 
program of this work. Regarding Table 4.7, it is noticeable that introducing 15 % of the fleet 
to the DR program of this work will lead to a reduction of the difference between maximum 
and minimum traded volumes of 18.78 % when compared to the inflexible demand approach. 
By reducing the percentage of the fleet participating in the DR program to half, the 
variation between the difference of the minimum and maximum value for traded volumes 
with and without DR reduces from 37.95 % to 18.78 %. Thus, decreasing the percentage of DR 
participation of the fleet leads to a lower variation between the traded volumes throughout 
the day. 
• Costs of purchasing energy: 
 
Once more, the average cost of the purchased energy by the agents is calculated 
throughout the formulation in (21). In Figure 4.14 it is possible to observe the average cost of 
purchasing energy throughout the iterative process for the part of the fleet participating in 
the DR program of this work. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 - Traded volumes, 15 % DR penetration 
 
Table 4.7 - Variation between maximum and minimum traded volumes, 15 % DR penetration, in 
kWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 15 % DR 
Min 56,34 97,37 
Max 611,60 548,34 
Max - Min 555,26 450,98 
Variation (%) 18,78% 
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The average cost for buying energy without demand response is 48.67 €/MWh. The 
average cost for purchasing energy by using the model developed in this work diminishes 
throughout the iterative process, as agents start defining the optimal actions, leading to a 
final average cost around 27.47 €/MWh. Thus, in a scenario with 15 % DR penetration the 
model developed in this work demonstrates to be considerably effective on diminishing the 
costs of purchasing energy. 
 
• Error: 
 
In Figure 4.15 it is possible to observe the difference between Eexp and E24 for each agent 
of the fleet. As it can be observable in Figure 4.15, the variance between the expected value 
of energy to purchase and the real value is, once more, not severely significant. 
Figure 4.16 shows the variation between Eexp and E24 in terms of percentage. As it can be 
seen in Figure 4.16, during some hours of the day, the variation between both values is 
considerable, such as in hour 9. However, the variation between Eexp and E24 is also very low, 
such as in the last subsection, proving the efficiency of the model to obtain a small deviation 
between Eexp and E24 in a scenario with 15 % DR penetration. 
 
 
Figure 4.14 - Average cost of purchasing energy 
 
Figure 4.15 - Difference between expected purchased energy and the real value of purchased 
energy 
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Figure 4.16 - Variation between assigned quantity of energy and purchased quantity of energy 
 
• Evolution of the reward: 
 
Figure 4.17 demonstrates the evolution of the fleet’s reward throughout the iterative 
process. Once more, it is possible to observe that after a certain number of iterations, the 
value of the reward tends to converge to its optimal value, as Figure 4.17 demonstrates. 
 
4.2.1. Centralized vs. Decentralized scheme 
 
Figure 4.18 presents the energy purchased throughout the day by the 15 % of the fleet 
considering DR, both using the decentralized approach and the centralized one. Similarly to 
Figure 4.8, the load profile of the 15 % of the fleet using both approaches is similar, 
especially during peak hours. During valley hours, the variance is more noticeable because it 
is during those hours agents tend to buy energy to satisfy their shiftable loads, and therefore 
schedule their load consumption according to the followed approach. 
Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20 demonstrate that under a different level of DR penetration, 
both market clearing price and traded volumes barely vary from one approach to the other. 
Both values for the market clearing price and the traded volumes barely vary throughout the 
day, similarly to the scenario with 30 % DR penetration. 
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Figure 4.17 - Reward of the 15 % of the fleet considering DR 
 
 
Figure 4.18 - Purchased energy, 15 % DR penetration 
 
 
Figure 4.19 - Market clearing price, 15% DR penetration
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Figure 4.20 - Traded volumes, 15% DR penetration 
 
Table 4.8 presents the costs of purchasing energy per unit for the fleet considering DR. It 
shows that the results obtained with the decentralized scheme do not differ considerably 
from the results obtained with a centralized scheme.  
 
4.3. 60% DR penetration 
 
In both scenarios studied in the previous chapters, the part of the fleet considering the 
demand to be inflexible dominated over the part of the fleet considering DR. Both scenarios 
are more realistic in a near future, in which DR is still considered as a novelty. Therefore, it is 
highly important to observe the behavior of this model in a scenario considering DR to be 
main approach to follow when it is about buying energy. 
This scenario considers 60 % of the fleet to be participating in the DR program developed 
in this thesis, while the other 40 % remain as inflexible loads. 
 
• Market clearing price: 
 
Figure 4.21 presents the market clearing price throughout the day both without DR and 
considering the model developed in this work. 
 
Table 4.8 - Average cost of purchasing energy, decentralized vs. centralized model, 15% DR 
penetration, in €/MWh 
Decentralized model Centralized model 
27,47 25,74 
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Figure 4.21 - Market clearing price, 60% DR penetration 
In the scenarios studied before considering the DR level to be 60%, variations between 
the minimum and the maximum clearing price of the market were 18.78% and 37.95 %, for the 
DR levels of 15% and 30% respectively, when comparing to an approach without DR. Even 
considering the variation of these two levels to be considerably low when compared to an 
approach without demand response, whose variation between maximum and minimum is 
48.67 €/MWh, it is possible to observe in Figure 4.21 that the price curve throughout the day 
is more balanced, with a variation between minimum and maximum value of 61.87 % when 
comparing to an approach without DR. This happens due to the fact that DR dominates over 
inflexible demand, leading the majority of the fleet to purchase energy evenly throughout the 
day, as for more than half of the fleet has not only sensitivity to the price to pay for energy 
during the day but also influence in the market clearing price.  
Table 4.9 presents the variation between maximum and minimum clearing price in a 
scenario with 60 % DR penetration level and in a scenario with inflexible demand. As in can be 
observable, introducing 60 % of the fleet to the DR program of this work led to a considerable 
reduction in the variation between maximum and minimum market clearing price.  
 
• Consumption profile: 
 
Figure 4.22 shows the purchased energy of the 60 % of the fleet considered in this 
analysis, without demand response and considering the decentralized DR scheme of this work. 
 
Table 4.9 - Variation between maximum and minimum MCP, 60 % DR penetration, in €/MWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 60 % DR 
Min 8,31 20,18 
Max 87,74 50,46 
Max - Min 79,42 30,28 
Variation (%) 61,87% 
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In terms of variation between the maximum and minimum value of purchased energy 
throughout the day, using the DR model of this work leads to a reduction of the variance 
between maximum and minimum amount of purchased energy by 54.59 % when compared to 
the uncontrolled approach, as it can be seen in Table 4.10. 
 
 
Figure 4.22 - Purchased energy, 60% DR penetration 
 
Table 4.10 - Variation between maximum and minimum quantity of bought energy, 60 % DR 
penetration, in kWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 60 % DR 
Min 41,47 53,59 
Max 353,73 195,40 
Max - Min 312,25 141,81 
Variation (%) 54,59% 
 
• Traded volumes: 
 
Figure 4.23 shows the traded volumes of energy throughout the day for both studied 
scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 4.23 - Traded volumes, 60% DR penetration 
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Following the market clearing price variation, the difference of the minimum and 
maximum traded volume varied accordingly, as the price is dictated by the amount of 
purchased energy by the entire fleet.  
Table 4.11 presents the variation between maximum and minimum traded volume of 
energy in both approaches. A variation of 65.00 % is explained by the fact that the number of 
end-users participating in the DR program is superior to the number of users whose demand is 
inflexible, and thus DR dominates over inflexible loads, leading to a huge impact in which 
concerns to leading the load diagram to be more even throughout the day. 
 
• Costs of purchasing energy: 
 
Once more, the average cost of the purchased energy by the agents is calculated 
throughout the equation (21). In Figure 4.24 it is possible to observe the average cost of 
purchasing energy throughout the iterative process. 
The average cost for buying energy without demand response is 46.54 €/MWh. The 
average cost by using the model developed in this work diminishes throughout the iterative 
process, as agents start defining the optimal actions, leading to a final average cost around 
31.57 €/MWh. Thus, in a scenario with 60 % DR penetration the model developed in this work 
demonstrates to be considerably effective on diminishing the costs of purchasing energy. 
 
 
Figure 4.24 - Cost of purchasing energy 
 
Table 4.11 - Variation between maximum and minimum traded volumes, 60 % DR penetration, in 
kWh 
 
Inflex. Demand 60 % DR 
Min 62,95 153,64 
Max 585,50 336,53 
Max - Min 522,55 182,88 
Variation (%) 65,00% 
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• Error: 
In Figure 4.25 it is possible to observe the difference between Eexp and E24 for each agent 
of the fleet. As it can be observable, the variance between the expected value of energy to 
purchase and the real value is, once more, not severely significant. 
Figure 4.26 shows the variation between Eexp and E24 in terms of percentage. As it can be 
seen, during some hours of the day, the variation between both values is considerable, such 
as in hours 13 and 14. However, the variation between Eexp and E24 is also very low, such as in 
the last subsections, proving the efficiency of the model to obtain a small deviation between 
Eexp and E24 in a scenario with 60 % DR penetration. 
 
 
Figure 4.25 - Difference between expected purchased energy and the real value of purchased 
energy 
 
 
Figure 4.26 - Variation between assigned quantity of energy and purchased quantity of energy 
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• Evolution of the reward: 
Figure 4.27 demonstrates the evolution of the reward during the iterative process. Once 
more, agents try a varied set of actions a sufficient number of times before starting to 
determine which actions are more profitable. After a certain amount of iterations, agents 
start performing the best actions, leading the results to be optimal in terms of diminishing 
the cost of purchasing energy of the fleet. 
 
4.3.1. Centralized vs. Decentralized scheme 
 
Figure 4.28 shows the purchased energy during the day of the 60 % of the fleet 
considering both DR schemes. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.27 - Reward of the 60% of the fleet considering DR 
 
 
Figure 4.28 - Purchased energy, 60% DR penetration 
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Regarding Figure 4.28, the variation of purchased energy outside of peak hours is more 
noticeable than in the previous scenarios. This happens due to the fact than while the 
aggregator purchasing energy on behalf of the fleet in a centralized model has perfect 
information. On the other side, increasing the size of the DR fleet increases the uncertainty in 
which concerns to price to pay for energy, as there are more agents influencing the market 
clearing throughout their individual bids, and therefore more possibilities in which concerns 
to the amount of energy to buy each hour. 
That same size variation also reflects on the market clearing price and traded volumes 
outside of valley hours, as it can be observable in Figures 4.29 and 4.30. 
 
 
Figure 4.29 - Market clearing price, 60% DR penetration 
 
 
Figure 4.30 - Traded volumes, 60% DR penetration 
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Table 4.12 presents the costs of purchasing energy per unit for the fleet considering DR. 
It shows that the results obtained with the decentralized scheme do not differ considerably 
from the results obtained with a centralized scheme.  
 
4.4. Results comparison  
 
The main goal of this work is to model a decentralized market-based scheme for DR, 
being the main goal to diminish the costs of purchasing energy. However, another problem 
associated with inflexible demand is the high demand for energy during peak hours, leading 
the network to considerable problems in which concerns to provide energy to the buyers in 
situations such as the failure of a generator. Correctly dimensioned DR programs lead the 
demand during peak hours to diminish, being easier for the network to provide end-users 
energy when there is a risk of demand to surpass the maximum level of energy the network 
can provide. Thus, another focus of this work is to study the impact of the decentralized 
model in the general load diagram considering the penetration level of DR. 
Figure 4.31 demonstrates the average purchased energy each hour by each agent. As it 
can be observable, the higher the penetration level of DR, the lower the variation of 
purchased energy during the day. To test the efficiency of the model developed in this work, 
the total cost of buying energy throughout the usage of the model is compared to an approach 
without demand response, in which all the loads are defined as inflexible, and a centralized 
approach, in which the aggregator has perfect information, and therefore is capable to 
reduce the costs of buying energy to its optimal value. 
 
Table 4.12 - Average cost of purchasing energy, decentralized vs. centralized model, 60% DR 
penetration, in €/MWh 
Decentralized model Centralized model 
31,57  29,58  
 
 
Figure 4.31 - Average purchased energy per agent
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Table 4.13 shows the total cost of buying energy of the fleet within the three different 
DR penetration levels and the three different approaches.  As it can be observable, the 
decentralized model is effective independently from the DR penetration level. While the 
decentralized model diminishes the cost of purchasing energy considerably when comparing 
to an uncontrolled approach, its values for the cost of buying energy don’t differ substantially 
from the centralized approach values.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the decentralized model developed in this work is a very 
reliable alternative to the centralized model in which concerns diminishing the costs of 
purchasing energy, while solving the issues related to the centralized approach such as the 
privacy of the agents.  
Table 4.14 presents the average cost of purchasing energy for the part of the fleet 
considering DR, regarding all three scenarios of DR penetration. As it can be observable, the 
average cost obtained throughout the usage of the model developed in this work diminishes 
the average cost considerably in comparison to the scenario with inflexible demand, and the 
deviation between both centralized and decentralized models is not accentuated.  
As the DR penetration level raises, the average cost of purchasing energy slightly raises 
as well. This is due to the fact that the bigger the number of participants in the DR programs, 
the bigger the competition for energy is during the hours DR agents purchase energy. 
However, increasing the number of participants doesn’t affect the average cost of energy 
linearly, as increasing the number of participants from 15 % to 60 % only increases the cost by 
12.97 % for the decentralized model, which leads to the conclusion that as the number of 
participants in the DR program grows the price to pay for energy grows as well, but not 
substantially enough as to lead the model to become obsolete.  
Thus, it can be concluded that not only the new decentralized model of this work not 
only reduces the cost of purchasing energy close to the optimality, but also that increasing 
the percentage of participants will not considerably affect the cost reduction when comparing 
to an approach without DR.  
It also helps diminishing the variation of minimum and maximum amount of purchased 
energy throughout the day, helping the network operators on providing energy in case of 
failure on serving loads during peak hours, and dealing with the growth of the energy fleet 
that leads to a raise in the demand for energy. 
 
Table 4.13 - Total cost of purchasing energy in all three approaches and all three DR level, in € 
DR level Inflexible demand Decentralized approach Centralized approach 
15% 39,32 €  22,03 €  20,80 €  
30% 78,44 € 48,23 €  45,58 €  
60% 150,97 €  102,20 €  95,94 €  
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Table 4.14 - Average cost of purchasing energy in all three approaches and all three DR level for 
the fleet considering DR, in €/MWh 
DR level Inflexible demand Decentralized model Centralized model 
15% 48,67 €/MWh  27,47 €/MWh  25,74 €/MWh  
30% 48,37 €/MWh  29,75 €/MWh  28,10 €/MWh  
60% 46,54 €/MWh  31,57 €/MWh  29,58 €/MWh  
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
A new decentralized market-based scheme considering demand response was developed 
in the present thesis, being the results obtained with the model compared to the ones 
obtained in an approach without demand response, and the ones obtained with a centralized 
model. 
The main goal of the thesis was to develop a bidding mechanism in which each agent 
defines its bids according to their urgency for buying energy, being the bids optimally placed 
throughout the usage of a Q-learning algorithm. Agents buy energy according to the market 
clearing price and their previously defined demand bid curves. 
In which concerns to the Q-learning algorithm, agents demonstrate to considerably 
optimize their bids, as the algorithm converges to optimal values as the iterative process 
follows through. To test the efficiency of the model in various near future scenarios, three 
levels of DR penetration were considered. For the three considered levels, the model 
demonstrates to be effective on reducing the costs of purchasing energy when compared to 
an approach without demand response. Agents participating in the DR program of this work 
buy more energy during hours in which the market clearing price is lower, diminishing their 
consumption during peak hours. 
Regardless the DR penetration level, the developed model not only reduces the cost of 
energy considerably, but also diminishes the variation between the maximum and minimum 
value for traded volumes of energy. As the DR level ascends, the same variation demonstrates 
to diminish, proving the efficiency of the method on leading the load diagram of the entire 
fleet to be more balanced, reducing problems related to high levels of demand during peak 
hours. When comparing the results to the ones obtained with a centralized model, it is 
observable that the results are considerably approximate and slightly higher. When comparing 
the market clearing price profiles and the load consumptions profiles of both methods, the 
variation is small. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the model developed in this work not only reduces 
substantially the costs of purchasing energy in a scenario without DR, but also is a reliable 
alternative to the centralized models, solving the scalability and privacy problems related 
with this type of model. The new decentralized model of this work demonstrates to be an 
approach closer to the one to be developed in a near future, in which a bigger amount of 
household consumers will have access to DR programs.  
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5.1. Future work 
 
The concept of DR is a fresh topic regarding the fact that few people have access to 
programs at the present time. Previous DR models either have problems related to scalability 
or load synchronization. Thus, the innovation to me made in this field has a wide range of 
options to be explored and developed in a near future. 
Regarding the work developed in this thesis, one interesting feature would be 
considering consumption uncertainty, as to test the impact in the cost of purchasing energy in 
such scenario. To approach the model to real market situation, both uncertainty in the 
demand and supply could be considered, using real market data so the obtained results would 
be closer to the ones to be observed in the future. As mentioned in [42-46], many algorithms 
were proposed as a way to determine the energy prices and the costumers’ responses to 
them. In these scenarios, supply and demand are considered to match DR being the 
aggregated demand equalized to the supply. However, since households aren’t isolated but in 
fact connected to energy networks, another interesting feature would be integrating the 
model into an OPF market clearing, similarly to [47]. 
Considering the model of this work is directed to household consumers, an algorithm as 
the one presented in [48] for intelligent home energy management could be introduced so 
end-users could define their load serving priorities. Throughout the usage of the algorithm, 
household appliances would be served in a particular order previously defined by the users, 
and load serving would be done not only according to their individual demand bids and the 
market price but also the load priority and also the particular urgency to serve a particular 
load, i.e., the state of every individual load would be considered, as for the agents to buy 
energy according to their comfort preference in a more detailed way. 
Another interesting development would be adapting the three-block demand bid curves 
to a more detailed one, in which every user sets, as an example, one block for each load, 
according their priority, and serve every particular load according to the price, leading the 
agents to have not only a bigger degree of freedom, but also to purchase the exact amount of 
energy to serve a certain amount of loads, as opposition to the approach of this thesis, in 
which all the shiftable loads are simplified to a single one. As to model each load individually 
and in a more appropriate futuristically way, each load could be shaped as a physical-based 
load such as in [49-53]. 
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Appendices 
 
 
 
A.1 Actions 
 
 
 
This appendix serves to demonstrate the influence actions may have on finding solutions 
close to the optimal ones, as to apply the most profitable actions during the simulations of 
the results presented in Chapter 4. All tests were performed merely to the 30 % DR 
penetration level. 
 
A.1.1. Testing B1 
 
To test the influence of the parameter B1 on reducing the costs of purchasing energy, two 
different scenarios are considered. In Scenario 1, B1 has a set of nine values between 10 and 
90, two below the market clearing prices without DR (4 and 5), and two above the same 
market clearing price range (100 and 105). Three values of B2 are defined, and thus a total of 
39 actions are set. In Scenario 2, the most popular actions regarding Scenario 1 are tested as 
to observe the influence in the cost of purchasing energy. Five different values are defined 
for B1 between 10 and 30, and the same three values for B2 are defined, leading to a 
settlement of 15 actions in total. 
As in can be seen, considering merely the most profitable actions reduces the amount of 
purchased energy during the first hours of the day. In which concerns to the average cost of 
purchasing energy, Table A.1 presents the average cost for both scenarios for the 30 % of the 
fleet considering DR, leading to the conclusion, Figure A.1 presents the bought amount of 
energy for both scenarios. reducing the number of actions to a set of values close to the most 
popular actions reduces deviations between the expected amount of energy to purchase and 
the actual value for the purchased energy. Figure A.2 demonstrates the amount of purchased 
energy of one agent of the fleet. As it can be seen, when the set of actions is more adequate 
and approached to the most profitable actions, the agent tends to purchase energy more 
evenly throughout the day. 
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Figure A.1 – Purchased energy in both considered scenarios 
 
Table A.1 - Average cost or purchasing energy for both considered scenarios, in €/MWh 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
30,96 29,75 
 
 
 
Figure A.2 - Purchased energy of one of the agents of the fleet considering both scenarios, in kWh 
 
A.1.2. Testing B2 
 
As to test the influence of B2 in the cost of purchasing energy, three values are defined, 
6.9, 10.35, and 13.8. The first scenario only considers 10.35, being the two other values 
attributed to the second scenario as to test the impact of extending the range of actions. 
Figure A.3 presents the purchased amount of energy for both scenarios. It is observable 
that for both scenarios the amount of purchased energy doesn’t differ considerably. Table A.2 
presents the average cost of purchasing energy for both scenarios. A wider range for B2 leads 
to a smaller cost for purchasing energy.  
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Figure A.3 - Purchased energy by the 30 % of fleet considering DR for both scenarios, in kWh 
 
Table A.2 - Average cost of purchasing energy for both scenarios, in €/MWh 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
30,96 29,75 
 
A.2 Q-learning parameters 
 
This appendix serves to demonstrate the influence of variations in the parameters 
regarding the Q-learning formulation. The influence of the penalty term is also demonstrated. 
All tests were performed merely to the 30 % DR penetration level. 
 
A.2.1. and 
 
As to observe the influence of the parameters  and  throughout the iterative process, 
two different scenarios were considered. 
In the first scenario,  is equal to 0.6 and  equal to 0.8 during the entire iterative 
process. In the second scenario,  is equal to 0.6 and its value diminishes to 0.2 throughout 
the iterative process, while  diminishes from 0.8 to 0.1 during the iterative process. 
Figure A.4 presents the comparison between both scenarios. As it can be seen, diminishing 
the values of the two variables during the iterative process lead to better results in which 
concerns to find the optimal results. This happens especially due to the fact that diminishing 
 leads the algorithm to exploiting over exploring, and from iteration 300 to 500 agents opt by 
the most profitable actions most of the times. 
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A.2.2. Penalty 
 
As to evaluate the effect of the penalty term w in defining the optimal solution, Figure A.5 
presents the evolution of the reward of the 30 % of the fleet participating in the DR program 
of this work throughout the iterative process for three different values for w. As it can be 
seen, independently from the value of w, the reward converges to approximately the same 
value, diminishing the total reward as w grows due to the fact that deviations between the 
expected amount of energy to purchase and the actual value of bought energy are more 
penalized when w has a higher value. 
 
Figure A.4 - Evolution of the reward for both considered scenarios 
 
 
Figure A.5 - Evolution of the reward considering three different values for the penalty term 
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